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Abstract
This paper shows that countries characterized by a financial accelerator mech-
anism may reverse the usual finding of the literature – flexible exchange rate
regimes do a worse job of insulating open economies from external shocks. I
obtain this result with a calibrated small open economy model that endogenizes
foreign interest rates by linking them to the banking sector.s foreign currency
leverage. This relationship renders exchange rate policy more important com-
pared to the usual exogeneity assumption. I find empirical support for this predic-
tion using the Local Projections method. Finally, 2nd order approximation to the
model finds larger welfare losses under flexible regimes.
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1   Introduction  
Over the past 15 years, emerging market countries have faced severe financial crises, resulting in large costs of 
bank restructuring, extended periods of contraction and high unemployment. Theoretical and empirical studies have 
blamed the inability of pegged regimes to withstand speculative attacks, especially with rapidly growing 
international financial activity during this period. Advocates of this view have advised countries to float their 
currency. Despite these developments, emerging market economies have been reluctant to float due to several 
reasons1. Among these are the lack of central bank credibility, large terms of trade shocks, high inflation due to 
exchange rate pass through and liability dollarization.  
The effect of liability dollarization has been analyzed by the “Balance Sheet Effects” literature2. These studies 
argue that the chance of a financial crisis increases with high levels of foreign currency denominated liabilities, 
maturity mismatches and bad loans3. Despite the benefits of tight exchange rate regimes in limiting the fluctuations 
of the foreign liability component of bank balance sheets, consensus in the literature is that the involuntary interest 
rate adjustments under these regimes in response to external shocks exacerbate the financial distress and outweigh 
the positive effects on balance sheets. 
This paper compares the relative strength of the two effects mentioned above and measures the performance of 
different exchange rate regimes4. It formulates a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
                                                 
1 Countries that declared their commitment to floating regimes have not allowed their currency to float freely. The literature has analyzed this 
concept under the “Fear of Floating” heading. 
2 See Chang and Velasco (1998), Calvo (2001), Eichengreen and Hausman (1999), Cepedes Chang and Velasco (2001), Scheider and Tornell 
(2004). 
3 Table 1 reports the change in exchange rates and real GDP for the period before and after the crises together with the foreign currency 
leverage of the banking sector for countries that have had financial crisis and countries that have financial and trade linkages with these 
countries. The important observation is that in most of the cases large depreciations coupled with high bank leverage have caused a decline in 
output, whereas countries that have banking sectors with low or negative leverage like Uruguay, Philippines, Vietnam and Mexico have 
recorded either an increase or a mild drop in output after the crises. 
4 Different exchange rate regimes correspond to Taylor rules with different exponents of the exchange rate term. Empirical studies suggest 
that interest rates are sufficiently important instruments in exchange rate manipulation in emerging markets,  Calvo and Reinhart (2000).  
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(DSGE) model where terms of foreign credit depends on the balance sheet of domestic banks and there is a 
financial accelerator mechanism.   
The financial accelerator framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) (BGG) is a convenient starting 
point for the purposes mentioned above for two reasons. First, it allows for the effects of the shocks to be amplified 
through its effects on the balance sheets of the firms in the economy, which in turn provides a better fit of the 
model’s output to the actual data5. Second, the model includes a domestic financial sector enabling the analysis of 
balance sheet effects and foreign creditor behavior when the contract between the domestic banking sector and the 
foreign sector is defined. 
Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001) (GGN) extend this model to a small open economy setting and show as 
mentioned above, how the central bank has to peg the interest rates to the foreign rates under a fixed regime and 
thereby cause a hike in real interest rates in response to adverse external shocks. The recession caused by these 
shocks is less profound under flexible regimes where a part of the negative effect of the external shock is absorbed 
by the depreciation of the currency.  Furthermore, this contrast between the performance of different exchange rate 
regimes becomes more apparent when the financial accelerator mechanism is included due to its implicit 
amplification mechanism. 
Analysis in this paper alters the framework of GGN in two ways. First, domestic banks are only able to diversify 
the idiosyncratic shocks but are vulnerable to systematic ones. In the GGN model, the banks are able to diversify 
the aggregate risk and always collect the market rate of return by integrating the shock into an ex-post contract with 
the firm. This alteration provides a better representation of the actual functioning of the market and also allows 
banks’ net worth to fluctuate over time, which in turn plays a crucial role in foreign interest premium6.  
Second, instead of assuming foreign interest rates are purely exogenous, the role of the foreign sector is defined 
more rigorously by deriving the relationship between the balance sheets of domestic banks and the interest rate 
charged on loans by foreign creditors. This in turn is governed by a financial accelerator mechanism similar to the 
one between the domestic banks and firms7. More specifically, the contract between the domestic banks and foreign 
creditors is such that if the banks become more leveraged, the interest rates charged by the foreign creditors 
                                                 
5 BGG use this model to create the large amplification mechanism missing in the standard RBC models. 
6 The terms of the ex-ante contract in this paper are determined before the realization of the technology or foreign interest rate shock the next 
period. The terms of the contract in BGG on the other hand change with the level of the technology shock the following period.  
7 GGN assume that the foreign interest rates are exogenous. 
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increase. Furthermore, the assumption of one hundred percent foreign currency denominated debt used in this paper 
renders central bank exchange rate policy more important since exchange rate fluctuations have a direct impact on 
the translational exposure of the domestic banks and thus the foreign rates in this setting. 
Impulse responses obtained from the calibrated and linearized model show, contrary to the majority of the 
literature, that external shocks and technology shocks lead to greater output volatility under flexible regimes when a 
country risk premium mechanism is included in the model. The results exhibit how economies become highly 
leveraged when asset prices increase, and how price fluctuations increase (decrease) the amplitude of output 
response under flexible (fixed) regimes when faced with aggregate technology and external shocks8. It is important 
to state that these findings do not imply the superiority of pegged regimes. A better interpretation would be that for 
countries in need of foreign finance to develop, a stable domestic financial market is essential, and that a clean float 
exchange rate regime is not appropriate in this setting.  This model should be construed as a non crisis framework 
since the linearization technique employed is not suitable to capture the dynamics governing crisis periods. Despite 
this fact, the comparison of exchange rate regimes, within this framework has crisis implications provided that the 
deteriorating domestic financial conditions eventually initiate large capital reversals. 
First order approximation methods used to solve the model are not capable of capturing the effect of risk on the 
behavior of agents. To measure the significance of the country risk premium on the economy, a welfare analysis 
with unconditional moments is conducted using the second order approximation algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe. The results are in line with the first order approximation findings and show that tight exchange rate regimes 
reduce, flexible regimes increase welfare cost when the country risk premium is included. Hence, this risk premium 
constitutes an automatic stabilizer under fixed regimes and dampens the effect of an initial shock. Welfare effects 
are also measured using conditional moments because unconditional computations do not account for the welfare 
effects during the transition period from one steady state to another. Finally, the paper investigates if there is 
empirical support for the theoretical results using the Local Projections method of obtaining impulse responses. 
This model includes Emerging Market Bond Indices (EMBI) instead of advanced country lending rate averages as a 
proxy for foreign interest rates. Results show that output responses to external shocks are smaller with relatively 
fixed regimes. Following the literature, I also include a weighted average of advanced country lending rates and fail 
to distinguish the difference in output responses under the two regimes. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3 describes the effects of the financial accelerator mechanism and 
                                                 
8 Leverage is defined as net foreign liabilities divided by the net worth of the domestic banks. 
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different exchange rate regimes, defines the foreign sector and the contract with the banks, and shows how the 
results differ from a replicated version of GGN. Section 4 discusses the methodology and the results of the welfare 
analysis. Section 5 provides the empirical support. Section 6 concludes. 
2   The Model 
 
 
The framework utilized is a small open economy DSGE model with price rigidities. The households in the 
economy consume domestic and foreign goods, supply labor and save. The production side of the economy has 
three types of agents: the capital producers, the perfectly competitive entrepreneurs, and the monopolistically 
competitive retailers. Entrepreneurs purchase capital from capital producers, hire labor and produce identical 
wholesale goods, which are in turn sold to the retailers. Retailers package wholesale goods at no resource cost and 
sell the final output. Retailers are the source of price stickiness and their pricing scheme follows that of Calvo. 
The financial side of the economy consists of three different agents: domestic banking sector, foreign creditors 
and the central bank. The domestic banking sector-firm relationship is characterized by the financial accelerator 
mechanism by which the demand for capital depends on the net worth of the entrepreneurs and capital investment 
affects the net worth of the entrepreneurs by altering asset prices.  
The foreign creditors lend to the domestic banking sector. The interest rates charged by these agents have an 
endogenously determined component, which depends negatively on the net worth of the domestic banking sector 
and positively on foreign debt stock, and an exogenous component. 
CB 
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The central bank’s goal is to stabilize output and prices. For this purpose the bank conducts monetary policy 
governed by a Taylor rule. The following sections describe the economy more rigorously. 
2.1   Households 
Households consume a composite good, tC  which is a CES aggregation of domestic and foreign goods 
represented by HtC and 
F
tC respectively where, 
H
tC  is a composite of the goods sold by the retailers. 
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the corresponding price index is given by, 
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Consumers buy goods, hold money,  tM  and save using their wages, tW , profits received from the retailers, tΠ , 
the returns on deposits, and their money holdings. Returns on domestic and foreign deposits are denoted as 
**
11 )1()1( ttttt DeRandDR −− ++ respectively, where te , 1−tR  and * 1−tR  represent the exchange rate, domestic and 
foreign interest rates respectively. The first order conditions are as follows: 
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intratemporal efficiency;  
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marginal utility of consumption; 
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intertemporal efficiency; 
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It will be assumed that the law of one price holds; 
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where *HtP and 
*F
tP are foreign price of home  and foreign goods9. Foreign demand for home goods is:  
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where foreign income *tY and foreign aggregate price level
*
tP will be taken as given. 
2.2 Wholesale Firms 
Wholesale firms are managed by entrepreneurs with constant returns to scale production function. 
αα −= 1itittit LKAY                      (13) 
where tA  is an iid aggregate productivity shock.    
Timeline 
 
                                                 
9  In my analysis *FtP is equal to one, for every period. 
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Capital expenditures are financed by the banks and enterpreneurs’ net worth10.  
itititt BNKQ +=−1                       (14) 
where itN is the net worth of the firm at the end of period t-1 and at the beginning of period t, itB denotes the funds 
borrowed from the banks and finally 1−tQ is the price of assets in period t-1. 
In addition to the economy wide technology shock, entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic shocks. Real returns to 
capital are composed of the idiosyncratic iid shock, itA , and the real aggregate return to capital, 
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w
tP is the price of the wholesale goods produced by the firms and tP is the aggregate price level.  
2.2.1   The contract between the banking sector and the firm 
The interest rate premium on loans is determined by the following contract. 
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itA , is the expected cutoff value of the firm specific shock below which the firm is unable to pay back its debt to 
the banks. itx is the interest rate charged to the firm, µ is the monitoring cost coefficient and 1−tR is the prime 
interest rate in the economy determined by the central bank. 
The above equation illustrates how banks equate expected revenues to opportunity costs. The first term on the left 
hand side represents the principal and the interest collected from the firm if it does not fail. If the firm fails, the 
banks acquire the returns to capital but have to pay a monitoring cost; this is reflected in the second term. The right 
hand side is the opportunity cost of the banking sector.  
itA  and the risk premium itx  together with equation (16) are determined simultaneously from, 
 ( ) ( ) itittittkttit BxRKQREA ++= −−− 111 1                   (17) 
                                                 
10 Here I am using entrepreneurs and wholesale firms interchangeably since the entrepreneurs make the production decisions. 
11 Gross return averaged across firms. 
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According to this equation, if itA is less than itA  then the firm is expected to default. Since there is a continuum 
of firms, banks are able to diversify the firm specific risk and receive the market rate of return when there is no 
aggregate shock to output.  
It is essential to mention that the banks do not include the aggregate technology shock in the contract since I 
would like the banks to experience financial problems due to aggregate shocks. This assumption is different from 
the BGG framework where as a part of the ex-post contract, the aggregate shock is incorporated in the interest 
premium and possible losses or gains are passed on to the entrepreneurs who are risk neutral. This deviation does 
not create a problem in terms of the interest rate charged or the relationship (18) shown below or any other 
component of the financial accelerator mechanism. This stems from the fact that the firms make their decisions on 
expected terms and the contract is built on expectations, therefore the equations that constitute the financial 
accelerator mechanism are independent of the realization of the aggregate shock. 
itA  is the contract value of the shock and is different from the actual cutoff value of 
*
itA which will be discussed 
in the foreign creditors-domestic banking sector relationship section below. From the revenue maximization 
problem of the firm, subject to the contract equation (16), it can be shown as in BGG that, 
0)(')(1 >•=− ϕϕ ittitt NsKQ                                 (18) 
where 
1
1
1
][
−
−
+= t
k
tt
t R
RE
s  
This equation is an important part of the financial accelerator mechanism; it shows that as the returns to capital 
increase relative to the market interest rate, firms become more leveraged by taking out more loans and investing 
more. Another observation pertaining to this equation is that since the relative returns to capital are the same for 
every firm, the leverage of these firms will also be the same, which in turn is useful for aggregation purposes. 
The equation can be inverted as, 
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This equation on the other hand shows that the banks will charge an interest premium equal to v(●) based on the 
leverage ratio, which in turn can be thought of as the supply of capital relation. As the firms become more 
leveraged the banks will charge a higher premium and v(●) will increase. 
                                                 
12 see BGG (1998). 
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The demand for capital in the economy is obtained from the aggregation of demand over all entrepreneurs.  
( )
t
t
k
tt
tt NR
RE
vKQ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= −
−
−
1
1
1 1
                                (20) 
Firms will base their investment decisions on the expected rate of return on capital and the market interest rate as 
implied by equation (19). Furthermore, given the fact that the interest rate premium is independent of idiosyncratic 
variables every entrepreneur will be leveraged by the same amount. 
2.2.2 Evolution of the Entrepreneur’s Net Worth 
The net worth of the entrepreneurial sector evolves according to the following equation, 
( ) ititt DVN γγ −+=+ 11                     (21) 
where returns to capital net of borrowing costs, itV is given by,  
( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ittkttitititittktA itit KQREAAFAdfKQRAV it 11*1 1* −−−∞ −−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= ∫                             (22) 
*
itA  is the actual cutoff value of the firm specific shock.  I am assuming that the firm specific shock occurs after 
the aggregate technology shock. Therefore the cutoff value of the firm specific shock will depend on the realization 
of the aggregate technology shock. 
The first term on the right hand side is the entrepreneur’s return from capital given that the firm does not go 
bankrupt. The second term is the expected debt payment. γ is the probability of survival of the entrepreneur. This 
variable is needed to prevent the entrepreneurs from building up enough net worth and avoid borrowing from the 
banks13. itD  is the portion of net worth left to the firm that replaces the one that goes out of business. 
Net worth is composed of the net returns to capital if the firm stays in business and what it begins with ( itD ) if it 
goes out of business. The actual cutoff value *itA is derived from the following relationship; 
( ) [ ] ittkttititittittktit KQREABxRKQRA 1111* 1 −−−− =++=                  (23) 
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13 Since internal finance is cheaper. 
 10
*
itA  represents the value of the firm specific shock that is needed for the firm to pay back its debt. This value 
depends on the aggregate technology shock. If the aggregate technology shock is low then ktR would decrease and 
the firm would need higher returns to capital shock to stay afloat. 
Since itA and tA are the same for every firm *itA is also the same for every firm. Thus equation (22) can be 
aggregated and the evolution of the total net worth could be derived as follows.  
( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ttkttitititttktA itt KQREAAFAdFKQRAV it 111 1* −−−∞ −−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= ∫                                        (25) 
Equation (25) together with equation (21) defines the second part of the financial accelerator mechanism. More 
specifically, if there is an increase in asset prices hiking up the returns to capital then the total net worth of the firms 
will increase14.  
If the entrepreneurs do not survive, they consume the returns to capital net of debt payments. 
( ) tet VC γ−= 1                      (26) 
where etC  is the entrepreneur’s consumption. The firms will hire labor according to: 
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where 1µ  is the markup on wholesale goods or the relative price of retail goods. 
2.3   Capital Producers 
Capital evolves according to equation (28) where there are increasing marginal costs to capital production. 
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Capital producers are perfect competitors. They use wholesale goods as inputs to produce capital according to the 
production function: t
t
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K
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⎛Φ  . The price of capital goods is derived from the profit maximization of these firms. 
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Equation (29) is the final component of the accelerator mechanism. If the entrepreneurs experience a positive 
asset price shock, they will borrow more and demand more capital. Their expected net worth the following period 
will increase, and as investment increases, they’ll put an upward pressure on asset prices and amplify the response. 
                                                 
14 Equation (20) can be used to show that,  0>
t
t
dQ
dV . 
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2.4   Retail Firms 
The retail firms are monopolistically competitive. They buy the wholesale goods and sell them after repackaging 
at no resource cost. The purpose of including these firms at this stage is to have a simple contract between the firm 
and the banking sector, whereas having a monopolistic firm would complicate the contract. The other benefit of this 
framework is that it allows for sticky prices and therefore an effective monetary policy. The demand for goods 
produced by retail firms is given by, 
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Following the pricing scheme of Calvo, only a portion of the retailers change their prices in a specific period.  
( ) ( ) θθ −−−= 1*11 HtHtHt PPP                     (32) 
Retailers maximize an intertemporal loss function and set their optimal price HtP* as follows, 
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, is the desired gross mark up over wholesale prices. If equations (32) and (33) are combined, one 
can solve for domestic inflation. 
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where the first term is the marginal cost to the retailers and the second term is the expected inflation rate. The 
output for the domestic goods sector will equal demand 
H
t
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t ICCCY +++= *                                 (35) 
2.5   Central Bank and Exchange Rate Regimes 
The central bank will follow different exchange rate regimes according to the Taylor rule below. Under a fixed 
exchange regime eγ  will take on high values and will be set equal to zero for flexible regimes. 
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The last item on the right hand side is the interest rate smoothing term. sstY , rrss and 
sse are the steady state levels 
of output, the real interest rate and the exchange rate respectively. 
If the exchange rate is fixed, *tt RR = since the interest parity condition holds (et=et-1) Otherwise changes in the 
domestic rate affects the spot exchange rate through the uncovered interest parity condition (9) above. 
The interest rates are determined after production takes place. Central bank has a direct effect on the net worth of 
the domestic banking sector by changing the value of foreign liabilities in domestic currency units. The exchange 
rate will also affect exports, imports and the profits accrued to the consumers through the change in relative prices 
of the domestic good. 
2.6   Model Parameterization  
The parameters utilized are taken from the analysis of Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci. In this respect, the 
quarterly discount factor β will be set equal to 0.99 initially. Habit persistence parameter b is assumed to be 0.6. 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion Ω  is initially set equal to 1 to obtain the log form used in (GGN). While share 
parameter γ is adjusted such that in steady state trade balance is zero, steady state export output ratio is set to 0.2. 
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ρ , is equal to 1.5 which together with the value 
of γ implies that domestic consumption share is 0.33.  Parameter k in the utility function is determined such that, 
labor supply elasticity is 2 and average hours worked relative to total hours available is 0.333.  
To calibrate technology and pricing, while capital shareα , depreciation rate and steady state markup rate is set 
equal to 0.35, 0.025 and 1.2 respectively, investment capital ratio elasticity of the price of capital and the 
probability of the retailer not adjusting the price level is assumed to be 0.75. Fixing the monitoring cost coefficient 
to 0.12 and the survival rate of the entrepreneurs to 0.9728 equates the steady state risk spread, business failure rate 
and the leverage ratio to 320 basis points, 5.3 percent and 1 respectively. 
For the central bank’s policy rule in the benchmark model while the exponents on inflation and output or πγ and 
yγ  take the values of 2 and 0.5 respectively, the exponent of the interest rate smoothing term τ is set equal to 0.9 
for the benchmark case. 
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3   Including the Foreign Creditor, Domestic Banking Sector Relationship 
3.1 Model Features 
This section adds a foreign creditor-domestic banking sector relationship to the financial accelerator framework 
discussed above. The contract between the two agents is identical to the one between the domestic banks and the 
entrepreneurs, such that interest rate premium depends on the leverage of the domestic banking sector. 
The foreign creditors have a perfectly diversified portfolio in the world, and have contracts with the countries, 
giving them an expected rate of return equal to the foreign interest rate. The budget constraint of the banking sector 
is given by, 
11111 +++++ +==− ttttttt FeNWBNKQ                                           (37) 
Banks’ net worth, tNW  is not sufficient and foreign funds are needed to finance the borrowing requirement of the 
real sector15. The net worth of the domestic banks is their net returns from the firms minus debt payments. 
( ) tttttt FhReVBNW 1*1 1 −+ ++−=                                             (38) 
where 1−th  is the risk premium and expected returns from the firms, tVB  is given by, 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ttktititttktA itititt KQRAAFKQRdAAfAVB it 1**10 11 * −− −+⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−= ∫µ                      (39) 
It is assumed that if the banks’ net worth falls below zero, then the banks fail to pay back their debt and the 
foreign banks receive the returns from the entrepreneurs and pay a monitoring cost similar to the domestic bank 
entrepreneur relationship above. Using this assumption and the relationships above one can solve for the critical 
value of the systematic technology shock below which the bank defaults.  
( ) ( )[ ]tttttt eFhRAVB 1* 11 −− ++=                                           (40) 
Foreign banks set their expected returns from the loans to the domestic bank equal to what they can earn in the 
world at the foreign interest rate, * 1−tR . Expected returns consist of principal and interest payments if the bank does 
not fail and returns from the firms net of monitoring costs if the banks fail to pay back their debt16.  
                                                 
15 All of the foreign funds are assumed to be foreign currency denominated. 
16 If the banking sector fails foreign creditors still lend to them. As net worth equals zero foreign interest rate equals its upper 
limit in the linearized model. 
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( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ttttA ttttt eFRAdFAVBAVBAF t )1()(11 * 10 −+=−+− ∫µ                                        (41) 
This setup enables us to obtain a relationship between the country risk premium and bank leverage similar to the 
relationship between domestic finance premium and firm leverage discussed earlier. More specifically, using 
equation (40) and (41) one can show that there is a positive relationship between the country risk premium and the 
leverage of domestic banks17. 
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The intuition is as follows. As foreign borrowing increases, given a certain amount of net worth, the cutoff value 
of the technology shock would increase and the foreign creditors would charge higher interest rates to compensate 
for the higher probability of default. Also as net worth increases, the amount of required foreign borrowing would 
decrease together with the risk premium. On the other hand, since the contract is in terms of foreign currency, a 
depreciation of the domestic currency would increase leverage and thus the risk premium. 
The additional parameter used in this section is the steady state level of foreign borrowing/GDP. This ratio is 
assumed to be 0.56 which is the GDP weighted average of 21 emerging market countries. This value generates a 
bank net worth to output and domestic credit to output ratio equal to 0.1 and 0.66 respectively and a country risk 
premium and probability of bank failure of 450 basis points and 1.3% respectively19. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1   Model Characteristics 
In this section the objective is to exclude the financial accelerator mechanism determining foreign interest rates or 
namely the country risk premium and to replicate the results of GGN20 . 
Figures 1A and 1B show that the deviation of output from its steady level is greater under a fixed regime than 
under a flexible regime in the benchmark model21. When faced with a positive technology shock and an increase in 
output, the central bank is able to respond under a flexible regime and mitigate the effect of the shock by increasing 
                                                 
17 The derivation of this relationship is provided in appendix B. 
18 A similar expression can be written in terms of tVB . 
19 Data source: IFS, Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, 
Peru, Poland, Qatar, Russia, S. Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela. EMBI index is used to calculate average risk premium.   
20  Comparison between exchange rate regimes and the significance of the financial accelerator mechanism under these regimes is conducted. 
21 The GGN model. 
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interest rates. But under a fixed regime the interest rates cannot be adjusted, and hence the increase in output is 
higher. 
Under a fixed regime, a positive shock to foreign interest rates is again fully absorbed by the change in the 
domestic interest rates. Since banks do not have foreign currency denominated obligations their balance sheets are 
not affected and the positive effect of having a fixed regime on balance sheets therefore is not realized. As the 
domestic interest rate rises investment falls. This drop in investment causes asset prices to decrease and the 
financial accelerator effect is observed. More specifically the decrease in asset prices shrinks the net worth of the 
production sector and induces the bank to charge a higher premium on its loans. This effect decreases investment 
further and the initial shock is amplified. 
If the central bank adopts a flexible regime, it has the power to stimulate the economy when investment drops and 
there is lower inflation and a limited fall in output and investment. Furthermore increase in net exports due to a 
depreciating currency helps mitigate the fall in output. The output response graphs without the financial accelerator 
effect show that the difference in output volatility under different regimes is not as high when the mechanism is 
turned off by setting 0=µ . This corresponds to the irresponsiveness of banks to the net worth position of the firms. 
Therefore the effect of the technology shock on output is limited. 
3.2.2 Including the Foreign Sector 
Figure 2 shows the responses to a positive technology shock under the two different exchange rate regimes for the 
model including the country risk premium discussed above.  
As a result of the favorable technology shock, the cutoff value of the technology shock decreases and there is a 
decline in the proportion of firms that fail. Firms expand their production and the returns to the banks increase. The 
net worth of the banking sector improves as returns increase and the debt payments decrease due to an appreciating 
exchange rate. 
The banks increase their foreign borrowing in order to meet the growing borrowing requirement of the production 
sector. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, despite the surge in foreign finance, exchange rate appreciation and a 
rise in net worth leads to a decrease in the country risk premium. With declining foreign interest rates, domestic 
interest rates are lowered to satisfy the interest rate parity condition and hence there is a further rise in output.  
Therefore based on this model, with flexible exchange rates the presence of the country risk premium exerts an 
accelerator effect via the contract between the foreign creditor and domestic bank, similar to the contract between 
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the domestic bank and the entrepreneur in the BGG framework. Fixed rates are better in terms of controlling the 
balance sheets of the banks and hence the foreign interest premium. Under fixed rates the country risk premium 
increases, since the exchange rate does not change and foreign borrowing increases more than the net worth of the 
banks. This rising country premium exerts an upward pressure on interest rates which contracts the initial surge in 
output and helps mitigate the effect of the shock. The decline in net exports with flexible regimes due to 
appreciation is not large enough to alter the results.  
To summarize, our findings imply that if a country risk premium is included, the results of GGN are reversed: the 
amplitude of the changes in output in response to technology or foreign interest shocks are greater with flexible 
regimes than with fixed regimes. 
3.2.3 Foreign Interest Rate Shock 
Foreign interest shock can be thought of as a change in the risk perception towards a country that is exclusive of 
bank balance sheets. The shock is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process that persists at the rate of 
0.95 per quarter. The results are depicted in figure 4 and point to similar observations.  
Under a fixed regime, the country risk premium turns negative as foreign borrowing decreases more than the 
decrease in net worth, hence there is a decrease in leverage. With a flexible regime on the other hand, depreciation 
of the exchange rate, coupled with a decrease in bank net worth dominates the decrease in foreign borrowing and an 
increase in leverage is observed. The increase in leverage amplifies the decline in output under the flexible regime.  
3.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis: 
The fixed-flexible comparison so far was based on specific parameter values for the Taylor under flexible 
regimes. In this section, I perform a grid search to find the minimum output volatility under flexible regimes and 
compare this value with the volatility under fixed regimes. Furthermore, I also exclude habit persistence, lower 
price stickiness and lower foreign interest shock persistence and report conditional standard deviations of output in 
Table 2. I obtain the results assuming that the economy is hit by both technology and foreign interest rate shocks.22 
While the values under the benchmark model column agree with the impulse responses, optimal volatility under 
flexible regimes is higher than the volatility under fixed regimes. This observation is robust to lower price 
stickiness and foreign interest rate persistence, and to the exclusion of habit persistence. The results also show that, 
                                                 
22 The variance of the foreign interest rate shock is calibrated to (0.032)2 which is obtained from a VAR model fit to 21 emerging market 
country averages using Blanchard-Quah restrictions. The variance of the technology shock is (0.01)2. 
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the external constraints on monetary policy argument, is not robust to low habit persistence and low price 
stickiness23. More specifically, output volatility is lower with fixed regimes even when country risk premium is 
excluded.  This observation implies that the central bank policy is less affective with lower price stickiness and 
habit persistence and the advantages of independent monetary policy under flexible regimes is less pronounced.  
Finally, I also find that incrementing the coefficient of relative risk aversion and lower persistence of foreign 
interest rates decrease the advantages under flexible regimes.  
4. Welfare Analysis 
The first order approximation technique employed in the previous parts is not appropriate for comparing welfare 
across different exchange rate regimes and different market structures. The commonplace practice in 
macroeconomic literature is to measure welfare effects using a second order approximation to the objective 
function and a linear approximation to the decision rules. Although this method can account for the effects of 
shocks on welfare through second order moments, it neglects the effects of these shocks on the unconditional and 
conditional means of the endogenous variables. 
For these purposes, this section measures the welfare effect of the financial accelerator mechanism and the 
country risk premium by conducting a second order approximation to the objective function and the decision rules 
of the model. The coefficients of the system of equations, obtained by the second order approximation are found 
using the algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). 
4.1.1 Unconditional Welfare 
Welfare effects are measured by computing the percent of steady state consumption consumers are willing to give 
up to avoid the effects of the underlying shocks24. 
The second order approximation to the utility function is of the form,25  
( ) ( )ttttt lLLkcVarCblELLkcEbCEU ˆvar121)ˆ()1(21)ˆ(1)ˆ()1( 2
2
1111
−−−Ω−−−−=
Ω−Ω−Ω−Ω−             (43) 
where tcˆ and tlˆ denote the percent deviation of consumption and labor around the steady state levels and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tttt lVarcVarlEcE ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  represent the unconditional means and variances of consumption and labor. 
                                                 
23 I assume that entrepreneurs can adjust their prices every two quarters following recent literature. See Eichenbaum, Fisher, Martin (2004).  
24 Following Lucas (1987) 
25 Money is omitted from the utility function following the standard application of welfare literature. 
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The objective here is to find the percentage of consumption that consumers would give up to avoid the effects of 
shocks on the utility.  
These effects can be separated into two parts, the impacts on the unconditional means, meanu , and the impacts on 
the unconditional variances of consumption and labor, varu . As mentioned above the commonplace application of 
conducting a linear approximation to the decision rules and taking a second order approximation to the utility 
function, while capturing the varu  fails to take account of meanu . meanu can be obtained from the following equality, 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ttmeanmean lELLkcEbCULkCbuLCuU ˆ1ˆ11ln1 11,1 1
1
−−−+=−−Ω−
−+=+ Ω−
Ω−
           (44) 
where, 
( )( ) ( )LkCbU −−Ω−−=
Ω−
1ln
1
1 1 ,                                            (45) 
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1
ˆ11
1
1
1 −⎟⎠
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and similarly varu can be obtained as follows, 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tt lLLkcVarCbULkCbu ˆvar121)ˆ()1(211ln1 11 2
2
11
1var
−−−Ω−=−−Ω−
−+ Ω−Ω−Ω−               (47) 
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bu                    (48)  
The additional calibration done in this section is to set technology shock variance to (0.01)2 and the persistence of 
the technology shock to 0.9 following the literature.  
4.1.2 Conditional Welfare 
While the unconditional welfare calculation discussed above has been utilized extensively due to its 
straightforwardness, this method does not account for the welfare effects during the transitional period from one 
steady state to another after a change in policy variables. Hence, measuring welfare with a one period utility that 
includes unconditional moments in a dynamic setting with discounting, avoids the fact that earlier periods have 
higher weights. Therefore, if agents in the economy save more in earlier periods to attain the new level of steady 
state consumption, losses of welfare computed using conditional moments, would be more than those with 
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unconditional moments26. To check the robustness of the results in table 3, a conditional welfare measure is 
constructed as follows, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛ −−Ω−
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where certainV0  represents the value function or the sum of discounted utilities when there is no source of variability. 
Similarly one can derive the second order approximation to the value function to measure the sum of discounted 
utilities when there is variability in the model27. 
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where tt landc
~~ are the artificial model output of consumption and labor deviations from their steady state values. 
Similar to the exercise above, meanu and varu are computed by measuring the level of steady state consumption 
needed to assume the effects of the risk through the first and second order terms respectively.   
4.2 Results 
I analyze four different models; the benchmark model, model with the financial accelerator (FA), model with 
country risk premium (CRP) and the model with FA and CRP simultaneously. The benchmark model mentioned 
here is the simple small open economy RBC model with price stickiness. 
The results from unconditional welfare computations are displayed in Table 3. Three distinct results can be 
gleaned from this table. The first one is that the country risk premium mechanism discussed above lowers the effect 
of the shocks under a fixed regime but amplifies it under a flexible regime. Intuition behind this result is as follows. 
Under a flexible regime, exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) following a positive technology shock leads to 
an improvement (deterioration) in the balance sheets of the domestic bank and a decrease (increase) in leverage 
which in turn decreases (increases) foreign interest rates. Since the change in foreign interest rates has a similar 
effect on consumption and labor as the technology shock the original effect is amplified. Under a fixed regime, the 
exchange rate does not change and there is a detrimental (positive) effect on bank balance sheets following a 
positive technology shock because of higher foreign borrowing needed to support domestic credit. Therefore, the 
                                                 
26 For example, Kim and Kim (2000) show that unconditional welfare measure can  produce the paradoxical result that autarky generates 
higher level of welfare than complete markets. 
27 The source of uncertainty is the technology shock. 
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original effect of the technology shock is mitigated due to balance sheet effects under a fixed regime. The rows of 
Table 3 corresponding to CRP shows an improvement in welfare relative to the benchmark model under a fixed 
regime and a decline in welfare under a flexible regime. 
The second result is that the financial accelerator mechanism is not as significant as the country risk premium and 
the presence of this mechanism decreases welfare more with a fixed exchange rate regime. This result is in line 
with the larger output response observed in part3 corresponding to a fixed exchange rate regime. While interest 
rates can adjust with a flexible regime and dampen the effect of the technology shock, they are fixed to the level of 
the foreign interest rate under a fixed regime. Hence I observe a 0.56 percent decline in welfare with a fixed regime 
in place and a 0.09 percent with a flexible one. 
The final observation is that the inability of a first order approximation to the policy rules to pick up meanu would 
conflict the literature and suggest that a fixed regime is better in terms of welfare under every specification. Table 4 
illustrates the results from the conditional welfare computations. Despite to a lesser extent, the mitigating and 
amplifying effects of CRP on welfare under fixed and flexible regimes respectively is also observed with this 
different measure. Furthermore, most of the losses under both regimes are due to the effects on the conditional 
means, and the importance of the financial accelerator mechanism has increased with the new measure.  
Bergin and Tchakarov (2003) using a similar analysis to this section find that welfare losses from exchange rate 
volatility can increase up to 4.5 percent of annual income when habit persistence is included in the model. My 
results support their findings and show how welfare losses can be further amplified with financial frictions. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This part analyzes the implications of different exchange rate regimes on the real economy that faces external 
finance shocks within the framework of balance sheet effects. Different from the existing empirical literature, the 
methodology proposed uses the EMBI instead of a weighted average of advanced country lending rates as a 
measure of external finance cost.  This approach accounts for the fact that the EMBI is a better measure of the 
external finance cost of an emerging market country, and that these countries are unable to borrow at advanced 
country lending rates. Using EMBI allows external finance costs to be affected by domestic economy variables in 
addition to their exogenously determined component. 
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In this context, I test if the balance sheet effects are strong enough to overturn the conventional wisdom. I also 
use a weighted average of foreign interest rates instead of EMBI following the literature and compare the results.  
The data set consists of monthly observations from 1998 to 2004 for the 13 countries listed in appendix C.  
Structural VAR methods have been put under scrutiny by recent research.  According to this literature 
two of the important short comings of these methods are that the misspecifications of VARs are large 
enough that they can lead to mistaken inferences and VARs which are designed to execute one period 
ahead forecasts, are subject to compounding misspecification errors with the forecast horizon. The latter 
shortcoming poses a problem for impulse responses which are functions of forecasts at distant horizons.  
In this respect, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) show that impulse responses using artificial data 
from a simple RBC model contradict the responses from the model itself.  The authors argue that this 
misspecification stems from the inability of specifications involving few lags to capture the persistence in 
model data that come from the low rate of depreciation of capital.  
Jorda (2004), proposes an alternative method for calculating impulse responses that is robust to the 
misspecification of the data generating process and uses projections local to each forecast horizon. More 
specifically, the following equation is estimated for each forecast horizon to obtain impulse responses, 
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where h denotes the maximum forecast horizon, y is {Output, CPI,  EMBI, R, E} and output denotes 
industrial production. Optimal p is determined at each horizon using the Akaike Information Criterion. 
The impulse responses corresponding to equation (10) are calculated from, 
hsddstIR ii ,.....,2,1,0ˆ),,( 1 == β                 (12) 
where id  represents the structural shock to the i
th element in y and corresponds to the ith  column of the 
D matrix obtained from the cholesky decomposition of the variance covariance matrix  of the reduced 
form,Ω  as follows: 
1' −==Ω PDandPP  
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A de facto classification is utilized to determine the countries that have followed a relatively tight and flexible 
exchange rate policy from 1998 to 200428. Crisis periods for Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina are excluded 
from the analysis together with periods of high exchange rate volatility29. Next, impulse responses are measured 
using the data from the two groups of countries in the model explained above. 
The responses to a 1 standard deviation shock to EMBI are displayed in figure 4. There are three important 
observations. First, contrary to the literature, impulse responses point to higher output volatility under flexible 
regimes. Second, under fixed regimes central banks do not respond as aggressively. Finally, the response of EMBI 
under flexible regimes is much higher. These findings point to the significance of the destabilizing effect of creditor 
perception towards a country and imply that more controlled regimes are better for sustaining external shocks in 
emerging market countries. It is essential to point out again that the results should not be interpreted as a case for 
fixed exchange rate regimes but rather as a possible explanation for the fear of floating observed in these countries. 
Next, I use an equally weighted average of the lending rates of U.S., U.K. and Japan instead of the EMBI. The 
results are illustrated in Figure 5 and point to the lack of evidence in favor of either of the two exchange rate 
regimes. Furthermore, the responses of the variables to foreign interest rate shocks are much smaller than the 
responses to EMBI30 shocks. Hence, there is more sensitivity to external shocks that are related to the conditions in 
the economy than to those in the advanced countries.  
6. Conclusion 
Recent literature on exchange rate regimes in emerging markets has supported flexible rates as the superior 
regime, considering the vulnerability of fixed regimes to speculative attacks. Despite this fact countries have been 
observed to control their exchange rate fluctuations.  
This paper has shown one reason for this so called “Fear of Floating”, as it links the balance sheet of the banks to 
the country risk premium. In this setting, exchange rate regimes that limit the effect of external shocks on bank 
balance sheets and hence on foreign interest rates are better in terms of limiting output volatility in emerging 
markets with high foreign currency exposure. The results should not be interpreted as a case for fixed regimes but 
rather a case against perfectly flexible regimes in emerging markets. This analysis suggests that countries with 
                                                 
28 The two groups of countries are listed in Appendix C. The standard deviation over the average is used to measure the relative 
exchange rate volatility during the period. 
29 The crisis periods are obtained from Kaminsky (2003). 
30 These results are not sensitive to different weighting schemes. Weights favoring U.S., U.K. and Japan interest rates and weights based on 
the proximity of the emerging market economies to these countries have yielded similar results. 
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shallow financial markets that have foreign exchange vulnerabilities should limit exchange rate fluctuations until 
their markets are developed enough to sustain a flexible regime or shift towards a monetary union or even 
dollarization.   
Further theoretical research in this area could analyze the effects of limiting foreign currency open position of the 
banks31 and the long run implications of a stable financial market32. Empirical and theoretical literature on maturity 
mismatches and the implications for monetary policy in emerging markets is scarce at this point. This is surprising 
since maturity mismatches played a crucial role in currency crises together with currency mismatches investigated 
in the literature. A framework similar to Chang and Velasco (1998), where there is a liquidation of long term assets 
when a country faces liquidity problems would be a suitable setup. This partial equilibrium framework could be 
built into a general equilibrium, simple RBC model to help explain the drops in output observed in the data after 
sudden stops.  
                                                 
31 This limitation would involve a compromise between foreign funds needed to grow and a more stable banking sector. 
32 The effects of short term stability on capital and human capital accumulation. 
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Appendix A: Positive relationship between aggregate tech. shock, tA and returns to the bank, tVB . 
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which can be simplified as, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
t
k
t
ttit
t
tt
k
t
t
k
t
tt
A
ititit
t
tt
k
t
t
t
dA
dR
KQAAF
dA
dA
KQRAF
dA
dR
KQdAAfA
dA
dA
KQRAfA
dA
dVB
it
it
it
itit
itit
1
**
*
1
*
10
*
1
**
11
1
*
−−
−−
−+−+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+−= ∫µµ
                  (A.4) 
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If we insert (A.5) for the same expression in 
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Appendix B: Leverage-Country Risk Premium relationship 
Leverage, risk premium relationship can be extracted from the bank, foreign creditor contract: 
( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) tttA ttttttt eFRAdFAVBeFhRAF t )()(111 * 101* 1 −−− =−+++− ∫µ                            (B.1) 
( ) ( )[ ]tttttt eFhRAVB 1* 11 −− ++=                                                                                                  (B.2) 
It is important to notice that foreign borrowing requirement tF  is predetermined before the contract according to 
equation (39) and that we are interested in the change in the risk premium foreign creditor charges as this 
borrowing requirement changes. For our purposes we have to find how the premium responds to changes in the 
cutoff value of the technology shock and how the cutoff value of the technology shock changes as foreign 
borrowing varies respectively. (B.2) and (B.1) can be used to obtain the following expression, 
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From this relationship we can see a positive relationship between risk premium 1−th  and tA . As tA  increases, 
both of the terms on the left decrease and 1−th  increases. The second term on the left decreases, since as tA  
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increases, the numerator doesn’t increase as much as the denominator, as it’s  an expectation of tVB  with tA as the 
upper limit of the domain and tVB is a strictly increasing function as shown in appendix A. Hence, 
( ) ( ) 0'1 >•ΩΩ=− whereAh tt                                (B.4) 
This equation implies that as risk of default increases risk premium charged on foreign finance increases. 
Expression (B.3) can also be rewritten in terms of tt Fe , tA  and 
*
1−tR as,  
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) tttA ttttt eFRAdfAVBAVBAF t )1()(11 * 10 −+=−+− ∫µ                                       (B.5) 
A positive relationship between tF  and tA exists if the following inequality obtained from the differentiation of 
(B.5) holds,  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01' >−− tttt AVBAfAFAVB µ                  (B.6) 
This expression is significantly greater than zero for values of tA  within 3 standard deviations of its steady state 
value, consistent with 1.3% bank failure rate. Given that there is an increase in the right hand side of equation (B.5) 
due to a rise in foreign borrowing, cutoff value of the technology shock has to increase since the increase in 
tVB together with the proceeds in case the bank fails, dominates the effects of increasing probability of default.  
( ) ( ) 0' >•= ϖϖ whereAF tt                      (B.7) 
Equation (B.7) together with (B.4) illustrate the positive relationship as follows, 
( ) ( ) 0'1 >•ΛΛ= − wherehF tt                      (B.8) 
This equation shows how given a certain net worth, as banks borrow more from abroad, risk premium increases 
due to higher probability of default. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between risk premium and net 
worth since the banks would borrow less as their net worth increases leading to a decrease in risk premium. Finally 
since the contract is in terms of foreign currency, changes in the exchange rate will have an effect similar to 
changes in foreign borrowing such that as the domestic currency depreciates (appreciates), the country risk 
premium increases (decreases). Combining the implicit relationships mentioned above yields: 
( ) 0'1 >•Γ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Γ=− whereNW
Feh
t
tt
t
                    (B.9) 
Appendix C: Monthly Panel Countries,    Period: 1998-2004 
  Standard Dev.(E-R) / Avg.(E/R) 
 Relatively Fixed E-R  Ukraine 1.44 
  South Africa 1.48 
  Ecuador 1.80 
  Colombia 1.82 
  Russia 2.50 
  Brazil 2.81 
  Philippines 2.87 
Relatively Flexible E-R  Poland 2.90 
  Mexico 3.28 
  Argentina 3.96 
  Turkey 8.47 
  Bulgaria 9.04 
  Malaysia 9.38 
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Table 1:       
  
% Change in 
Exchange Rate 
(1)
Leverage 
(2) 
GDP Growth 
(1) 
           1997 Malaysia   12.4    61.9    -4.5   
Asian Crisis Philippines   14.6    -10.7    0.1   
  Singapore   4.2    23.1    -1.2   
  Thailand   25.8    136.3    -9.6   
  Vietnam   5.8    -92.7    7.3   
1994 Ecuador   16.7    37.7    -11.5   
Peso Crisis Mexico   89.9    -30.7    -4.2   
  Peru   2.3    -23.3    10.3   
  Uruguay   26.0    -412.6    3.0   
1998 Argentina   0.0    37.6    -4.0   
Russian Default Chile   10.5    12.6    -1.6   
plus Brazil Colombia   23.2    42.9    -2.7   
abandoning the band Mexico   4.6    -155.1    2.4   
 Panama   0.0    -101.4    3.5   
 Peru   15.4    7.3    1.3   
  Russia   153.6    26.5    -12.1   
  Uruguay   8.3    -283.0    3.2   
2001 Turkish Crisis Turkey   96.0    41.1    -7.2   
2002 Argentina Crisis Argentina   206.0     122.1     -7.6   
      (1) % changes are over the year before and after the crisis 
    (2) Banking sector Net open foreign currency position over net worth (%). 
 
Table 2: Conditional Standard Deviations of Output With Both Technology and External Shocks 
  RBC 
Without Habit 
Persistence 
Non-logarithmic 
Utility Function 
 
Lower Price 
Stickiness 
Low Foreign 
Interest Rate 
Shock Persistence 
Persistence=0.25 
  Fixed 0.0554 0.0384 0.0513 0.0215 0.0403 
Benchmark FlexibleT(1) 0.0494 0.0473 0.0506 0.0299 0.0393 
  Flexible* (2) 0.0209 0.0203 0.0214 0.0226 0.0201 
  Fixed 0.0722 0.0399 0.0646 0.0223 0.0409 
Financial 
Accelerator
FlexibleT(1) 0.0505 0.0491 0.0511 0.0319 0.0403 
  Flexible* (2) 0.0217 0.0204 0.0219 0.0237 0.0281 
  Fixed 0.0403 0.0384 0.0413 0.0211 0.0342 
Country Risk 
Premium
FlexibleT(1) 0.0549 0.0579 0.0611 0.0394 0.0537 
  Flexible* (2) 0.0476 0.0438 0.0497 0.0342 0.0362 
  Fixed 0.0409 0.0349 0.0414 0.0233 0.0354 
FA and CRP FlexibleT(1) 0.0572 0.0582 0.0579 0.0374 0.0518 
  Flexible* (2) 0.0483 0.0414 0.0452 0.0344 0.0384 
(1) FlexibleT row shows the standard deviations of output corresponding to the benchmark Taylor rule.  
(2) Flexible* row shows the minimum standard deviation of output obtained from a grid search of Taylor rule parameters. 
 
0=b 5=Ω 5.0=θ
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Table 3: Unconditional Welfare Effects of Technology Shocks (1) 
      Fixed     
  u-overall u-variance  u-mean 
Benchmark Model -4.87  -0.73  -4.14 
        
Financial Accelerator (FA) -5.43  -0.72  -4.71 
        
Country Risk Premium (CRP) -2.47  -1.11  -1.36 
        
FA and CRP -2.73  -1.82  -0.09 
      Flexible     
  u-overall u-variance  u-mean 
Benchmark Model -3.85  -2.17  -1.68 
        
Financial Accelerator (FA) -3.94  -2.30  -1.64 
        
Country Risk Premium (CRP) -4.56  -4.05  -0.05 
        
FA and CRP -5.48   -3.53   -1.95 
(1) The numbers are percent deviations from steady consumption    
that consumers are willing to give up to eliminate technology shocks   
      
Table 4: Conditional Welfare Effects of Technology Shocks (1) 
      Fixed     
  u-overall u-variance  u-mean 
Benchmark Model -3.83  -0.36  -3.47 
        
Financial Accelerator (FA) -5.47  -0.55  -4.93 
        
Country Risk Premium (CRP) -3.44  -0.41  -3.03 
        
FA and CRP -5.08  -0.54  -4.55 
      Flexible     
  u-overall u-variance  u-mean 
Benchmark Model -3.68  -0.66  -3.02 
        
Financial Accelerator (FA) -4.96  -0.65  -4.31 
        
Country Risk Premium (CRP) -4.14  -0.88  -3.26 
        
FA and CRP -5.55   -0.67   -4.88 
(1) The numbers are percent deviations from steady consumption    
that consumers are willing to give up to eliminate technology shocks   
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FIGURE 1A: 
Benchmark Model, Output Response to a 1% Technology Shock 
          
 
 
 
FIGURE 1B: 
Benchmark Model, Output Response to a 1% Foreign Interest Rate Shock 
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FIGURE 2: 
Model Including Country Risk Premium, Response to a 1% Tech. Shock 
 
FIGURE 3: 
Model With Country Risk Premium, Response to a 1% Foreign Interest Rate Shock. 
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Figure 4: Panel Model Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock  
(EMBI, Monthly Data) 
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Figure 5: Panel Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock 
(Developed Country Average Interest Rates, Monthly Data) 
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